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A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER TITLE IX: CANNON V
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
"The search for significance in the silence of Congress is too often the
pursuit of a mirage."I
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of implication provides a basis for a court to allow an
individual who has been injured by another's violation of a federal statute to
maintain a private action for vindication of his rights when the statute itself
does not expressly authorize such a remedy. The traditional justification for
the doctrine has been that it permits a court to fill gaps left by Congress in a
statute's enforcement scheme. By insuring complete and comprehensive en-
forcement a court thus assists in effectuating the purposes underlying the
statute.
2
When it enacted title IX of the Education Amendments of 19723 to
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex by federally funded educational
programs and activities, 4 Congress left just such a gap. While taking care to
authorize the federal departments and agencies that administer educational
funds to enforce the statute and regulations promulgated under it, 5 Congress
did not explicitly grant similar powers to individuals aggrieved by violations
of the statute. It was not until Geraldine Cannon sought and was denied
admission to the medical schools of the University of Chicago and North-
western University that the gap was filled.
This comment will look briefly at the positions taken by federal courts
of appeals and district courts that considered whether to allow a private
right of action under title IX prior to the United States Supreme Court's
1. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, II (1942) (Frankfurter, J.).
2. A survey of the evolution of and rationale for the implication doctrine is beyond the
scope of this comment. For such an examination, see Note, Implyitg Civil Remedies From Federal
Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 285 (1963); Note, Implication of Private Actions From Federal
Statutes.- From Borak to Ash, I J. CORP. L. 371 (1976); Comment, Private Rights ofAction Under
Amtrak and Ash; Some Impliationsfor Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1392 (1975); Note, Implied
Private Actions Under Federal Statutes- The Emergence of a Conservative Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 429 (1976).
3. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1683 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as title IX).
4. Section 901 of title IX states that "[n]o person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance ...... 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (1976).
5. Section 902 of title IX provides in part:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any education program or activity . . . is authorized and di-
rected to effectuate the provisions of section 1681 of this title . . . by issuing rules,
regulations, or orders ... which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives
of the statute . . . . Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this sec-
tion may be effected (1) by the termination of. . . assistance . . . to any recipient as
to whom there has been an express finding . . . of a failure to comply with such re-
quirement, . . . or (2) by any other means authorized by law . ...
20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
DENVER LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 57:3
decision in Cannon v. Un'versity of Chtcago.6 It will then examine the rationale
underlying the Court's implication of a private action in Cannon and suggest
how the Court might have structured an essentially meritorious decision on a
firmer foundation.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE ACTION
In 1974 Geraldine Cannon applied for admission to the 1975 entering
classes of the medical schools at the University of Chicago and Northwestern
University. Cannon was thirty-nine years old at the time, and her chances of
gaining admission were virtually eliminated by reason of her age. Both
schools had express policies against admitting individuals over the age of
thirty who did not have advanced degrees. 7 Notwithstanding her purported
objective qualifications,8 Cannon did not receive a place in the entering class
at either medical school. She sought reconsideration and explanations from
admissions officials. Unsatisfied with their responses, she submitted a com-
plaint to the Chicago office of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW), alleging that the medical schools, recipients of federal
funds, had denied her admission on the basis of her sex in violation of title
Ix.
In July 1975, having received only an acknowledgment from HEW of
its receipt of her complaint, Cannon brought suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 9 That court dismissed the
6. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
7. Id at 680 n.2.
8. The complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois alleged that the average score on the Medical School Admission Test for applicants
admitted to the 1974 entering class was 575 and the average grade point average was 3.2. Can-
non stated that her test score was 585 and her grade point average was 3.53. Appendix to
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6-7.
In an affidavit offered to support the University of Chicago's motion to dismiss the com-
plaintJoseph Ceithaml, Director of Admissions and member of the medical school's admissions
committee, stated that Cannon's grade point average in the basic sciences was 3.17 compared
with a science average for the 1974 entering class of 3.7. He stated further that 51% to 60% of
the other applicants had scored higher than the plaintiff on the science portion of the Medical
School Admission Test and 81% to 90% had achieved higher math scores. Ceithaml concluded
with the observation that at least 2,000 applicants better qualified than Cannon were not of-
fered one of the 104 places available in the 1975 entering class. Appendix to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 26-27. See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1067 & n.2 (1976).
It would appear that there is some basis for challenging the sufficiency of Cannon's objec-
tive qualifications.
9. Cannon claimed violations of her rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976); the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-6, 2000c-8, as amended by title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1683 (1976); the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1976); and the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 292d (1976). Cannon v. University of Chicago, 406 F. Supp. 1257, 1258 (1976).
The original complaint named only the University of Chicago and Northwestern Univer-
sity as defendants. After learning from HEW that there would be some delay in investigating
her complaint, Cannon amended her pleading to include the Secretary and Region V Director
of HEW as defendants and a request for injunctive relief compelling HEW to complete its
investigation. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 680-82. The federal defendants
ultimately sided with Cannon in her contention that title IX does allow a private right of ac-
tion. Id. at 1952 n.8.
The title IX claim was premised on a theory that the age criterion employed by the medi-
cal schools has a disproportionately adverse effect on women, the students whose higher educa-
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action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and for failure to state
a claim for relief.'0 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the deci-
sion. I
On appeal to the Supreme Court, petitioner Cannon confined the issue
for resolution to whether a private plaintiff, allegedly discriminated against
on the basis of sex by an educational institution receiving federal financial
assistance, could maintain an action for relief under title IX. The Supreme
Court reversed the two lower courts after finding sufficient grounds for the
implication of a private right of action.12
II. THE LAW BEFORE CANNON
Plaintiff Cannon was not the first to assert the right established in title
IX as a basis for relief from alleged sex discrimination. Several individuals
had earlier brought suits under the Act, but all were unsuccessful for a rea-
son other than the absence of a private right of action. Following the Sev-
enth Circuit's decision in Cannon v. Universio of Chicago, only two other
federal courts had occasion to consider directly the private right of action
question.
A. The Early Decisions
In Trent v. Perrtlt'3 a young male plaintiff challenged his school's groom-
ing regulations, which restricted male hair styles but not those of females, as
discriminatory treatment of similarly situated individuals violative of title
IX. The court dismissed the action, declaring that recipients of federal funds
are not required to erase all differences between the sexes. It found that the
discrimination alleged by the plaintiff did not fall within the purview of sec-
tion 901 and was unrelated to the educational purposes for which federal
money had been allotted.
14
The plaintiff in Stewart v. New York Unzversity15 was a white female who
was denied admission to the defendant's law school. She sued to challenge
the school's minority admissions policy, basing her claims on title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 196416 and on title IX. Her right to maintain an action
under these statutes was not challenged. Rather, the court found that she
was required to show that the federal funds received by the law school con-
stituted "more than a de minimus" portion of its annual revenue'
7 to sup-
tion is more likely to be interrupted. Cannon argued that the age restriction thus had the effect
of excluding otherwise qualified female applicants from consideration by the medical schools.
441 U.S. at 680 n.2.
10. 406 F. Supp. at 1260.
1I. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1067 (1976), aJd on rehearing, 559
F.2d 1077 (1977).
12. 441 U.S. at 688-89.
13. 391 F. Supp. 171 (S.D. Miss. 1975).
14. Id at 171-73.
15. 430 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1976). Section 2000d states that "Inlo person . . .
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."
17. Stewart v. New York University, 430 F. Supp. at 1314.
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port her contention that the school was a recipient of federal funds. Further,
it was incumbent upon her to establish a material connection between the
federal assistance and the allegedly discriminatory admissions policy. 8 Not
having met these burdens, she failed to state a valid claim under either stat-
ute, and her action was dismissed.
Not until the case of Piasczk v. Cleveland Museum of Art t 9 did a court ex-
pressly consider the existence of a private right of action under title IX. The
question arose in an employment discrimination context and was not raised
by either party to the litigation; the court alone explored the issue in a
lengthy footnote to its opinion.20 The plaintiff had charged the defendant
with rejecting her application for employment as a museum guard solely
because of her sex. The court acknowledged that the plaintiff had an express
private remedy for discriminatory hiring practices in title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19 64.
2 1 Nevertheless, it also concluded that title IX supplied a
cause of action. The court reasoned that an implied private right of action
would be consistent with the congressional intent, evidenced by its enact-
ment of the statute, to eliminate sex-based discrimination in all facets of
educational programs and activities receiving federal funds.
22
B. The Impact of the Seventh Circuit's Cannon Decisizn
After the court of appeals' affirmance of the district court's finding in
Cannon that no private right of action could be maintained under title IX,
18. Id. "[T]he cases indicate that a private claimant must show greater government in-
volvement with the defendant when that defendant is a nongovernmental entity, than when the
private claimant sues the governmental entity directly, or when the government itself institutes
the action." Id at 1313.
19. 426 F. Supp. 779 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
20. Id at 780 n.1.
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-5 (1976). Section 2000e-5 provides, in pertinent part, that
"a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge [filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved or
(B) . . . by any person whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employ-
ment practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5()(l) (1976).
22. 426 F. Supp. at 780 n.I. Despite her "well pleaded § 1681 claim," the plaintiff did not
succeed in proving herself a victim of discrimination. Id. at 781.
Although notable for its consideration of the role of a private action in furthering congres-
sional purposes, Piascik now has very little, if any, strength in the wake of several recent deci-
sions. A U.S. district court in Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D.
Mich. 1977), aJ'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1979), declared invalid the employment regulations
promulgated by HEW pursuant to the authority granted in 20 U.S.C. § 1682. The court deter-
mined that "§ 1681 . . . addresses itself only to sex discrimination against the participants in
and the beneficiaries of federally assisted education programs" and felt "constrained to read this
language as a prohibition on sex discrimination against students and only students." d at
1031, 1032. This position was followed in Brunswick School Bd. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 866
(D. Me. 1978), affd, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir. 1979).
Likewise, in McCarthy v. Burkholder, 448 F. Supp. 41 (D. Kan. 1978) the court found that
the plaintiffs exclusive remedy for discrimination in employment lay in title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). It also noted that the plaintiff had, in any event,
failed to state a claim under title IX for the reasons that she had not joined HEW as a defend-
ant in the action and that she sought damages, a form of relief not provided by the statute. 448
F. Supp. at 43. It appears from the court's analysis that the problem was not with implication
of a private right of action under title IX but rather with the plaintiff's standing as an employee.
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the federal 23 courts confronted by the question did not uniformly apply the
Seventh Circuit's decision.
Female high school basketball players in Tennessee and Oklahoma
challenged the game rules issued by their secondary school athletic associa-
tions on the grounds that the rules violated both the equal protection
clause2 4 and title IX.2 5 The Tennessee court, relying on Cannon, ruled that
the plaintiff had no title IX action for the allegedly discriminatory treat-
ment. It also observed that even if a private right of action did exist, the
plaintiff would have to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in sec-
tion 902 before she could seek relief in court. 26 The Oklahoma court con-
ceded that the plaintiff might fall within the scope of section 901 of title IX
and would thus be entitled to bring a private action to protect her rights
were it not for the "elaborate system of administrative enforcement and judi-
cial review" established in section 902. It concluded by citing Cannon for the
proposition that no private right of action exists under the Act.2 7 Implicit in
both rulings is a finding that the statute creates no individual rights deserv-
ing protection.
Two other federal courts did not feel constrained to follow the Seventh
Circuit's lead, however. In Alexander v. Yale Unz'ersily28 the district court
found after a thorough analysis 29 that implication of a private action was
not only justified but was necessary to advance the congressional goals un-
derlying title IX. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, on the other hand,
merely distinguished Cannon, rendering it "an authority of limited signifi-
cance," in De La Cruz v. Tormey. 3° Without directly deciding whether the
language and purposes of title IX permit the inference of a private right of
action, the court concluded that section 901 does establish in individuals a
right to be free from sex discrimination in federally funded educational pro-
grams. 31 It found that where discriminatory conduct constitutes state ac-
tion, that right may be enforced in a suit brought under a section of the Civil
23. See also Williams v. Owen, 241 Ga. 363, 245 S.E.2d 638 (1978) (state court, relying on
Seventh Circuit's decision, refused to allow plaintiffs to maintain action based on title IX).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
25. Cape v. Tennessee Secondary Schools Athletic Ass'n, 424 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. Tenn.
1976), rev'don other grounds, 563 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1977); Jones v. Oklahoma Secondary Schools
Activities Ass'n, 453 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
26. 424 F. Supp. at 738.
27. Jones v. Oklahoma Secondary Schools Activities Ass'n, 453 F. Supp. 150, 153 (W.D.
Okla. 1977). Accord, Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1120
(E.D. Wisc. 1978) (dictum). See genera{y Carnes v. Tennessee Secondary Schools Athletic Ass'n,
415 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (female athlete brought action for preliminary injunction
based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 20 U.S.C. § 1681; no discussion of theory on which court al-
lowed action to proceed).
28. 459 F. Supp. I (D. Conn. 1977).
29. The court adopted the prior decision of the magistrate, who had applied the four-
pronged test for implication of a private right of action adopted by the Supreme Court in Cort
v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See text accompanying notes 37-57 nfa. The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit did not apply the Cort analysis in its initial decision in Cannon and on
rehearing gave it only a cursory consideration.
30. 582 F.2d 45, 60 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979).
31. 582 F.2d at 60.
19801
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Rights Act of 1871.32 Thus the plaintiffs in De La Cruz were able to assert
alleged title IX violations in the context of their section 1983 action against a
state college system. Although it recognized the existence of a federal right
worthy of federal protection, the Ninth Circuit did not suggest how a plain-
tiff such as Geraldine Cannon might secure that right from invasion by pri-
vate entities.
With the lower courts divided, it was left for the Supreme Court to
determine finally whether title IX does create a cognizable right and, more
importantly, whether it affords individual citizens an independent means to
enforce that right.
III. A RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER TITLE IX: THE SUPREME
COURT'S RATIONALE
In analyzing whether implication of a private right of action under title
IX is warranted, the Supreme Court in Cannon v. Uversi, of Chicago applied
the test it had earlier set down in Cori v. Ash. 33 Cori was the culmination of
attempts by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts to limit, without
extinguishing, the judiciary's authority to create private remedies by impli-
cation. 34 Its four-part test was an effort to define a methodology for a consis-
tent and uniform application by the courts of the implication doctrine.
Although the Cori analysis has been frequently used by federal courts to
imply private actions under a variety of statutes,35 only the federal court in
Connecticut applied it in a thorough fashion to the title IX implication ques-
tion.36 Thus, the Supreme Court's examination of the statute in Cannon in
the light of the four Cori factors was the first and, seemingly, most exhaus-
tive.
The initial inquiry under Cori requires a review of the statute in ques-
tion to determine whether it in fact creates a right. The test asks if the plain-
tiff is "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted"
3 7
and requires identification of the principal beneficiaries of the act.3 8 The
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Section 1983 states:
Every person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
This section was not available to plaintiff Cannon because she sued private institutions. Can-
non v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063, 1068-71 (7th Cir. 1976).
33. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
34. Se, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); National
R.R. Passengers Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974); Allen v. State
Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Calhoon v.
Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940); Texas
& Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
35. In his dissenting opinion in Cannon, Justice Powell noted that "no less than 20 decisions
by the Courts of Appeals have implied private actions from federal statutes" in the four short
years since the Cart decision. 441 U.S. at 741. See cases cited therein at 741-42.
36. Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. I (D. Conn. 1977). See text accompanying note
29 supra.
37. 422 U.S. at 78 (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)).
38. One commentator has challenged the Court's limitation of the benefited class to princi-
pal beneficiaries, finding no reason for so narrow an interpretation as long as the plaintiff does
[Vol. 57:3
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language itself may clearly state the right, but in the absence of such a decla-
ration, evidence of a "pervasive legislative scheme governing the relationship
between the plaintiff class and the defendant class," 39 which may be gleaned
from the statute as a whole or from its legislative history, will suffice.
Looking at the words of section 901 of title IX, 4 0 the Supreme Court
found in Cannon that the law was enacted to benefit persons discriminated
against because of their sex and concluded that the petitioner was a member
of the class of persons benefited by the Act.4 ' In reaching this decision the
Court relied upon the "right-creating language" 42 in which section 901 is
phrased to identify the persons whom Congress wished to protect or assist by
enacting the statute.
43
Having found that title IX does create a right in favor of private indi-
viduals, the Court advanced to the second criterion and scrutinized the stat-
ute's legislative history for evidence of congressional intent, "explicit or
implicit, either to create. . . a [private] remedy or to deny one."' 44 It is not
necessary to find explicit indications that Congress intended to allow a pri-
vate right of action; however, any finding that Congress clearly opposed such
a remedy is determinative.
45
Far from finding a legislative purpose to deny a private action, the
Court concluded in Cannon that title IX's history "plainly indicates" Con-
gress wished to create such a remedy.46 The basis for the Court's conclusion
was the statute's similarity to title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
41 Cit-
ing comments of title IX's Senate sponsor,48 the Court found an explicit
assumption by the congressional draftsmen that "Title IX . . . would be
interpreted and applied as Title VI had been during the preceding eight
years." 49 And, title VI had been construed by several federal courts as per-
mitting individuals aggrieved by alleged violations of that statute to main-
tain an action for appropriate relief.50 The Court considered it reasonable
to assume that the legislators knew of this construction and intended title IX
to profit from it. Moreover, the Court pointed to the inclusion in the pack-
age of statutes enacted simultaneously with title IX of a section authorizing
not prove to be merely an incidental beneficiary. Note, Impceaton of Prrwate Actionsfrom Federal
Statutes. From Borak to Ash, supra note 2, at 384.
39. 422 U.S. at 80-82.
40. See note 4 supra.
41. 441 U.S. at 694.
42. Id. at 690 n.13.
43. Such language is to be contrasted with the prohibitory language of criminal statutes or
the directive language of laws granting authority to agencies or other entities. Id. at 690-93.
44. 422 U.S. at 78.
45. 441 U.S. at 694.
46. Id.
47. See notes 4, 5, 18 supra. Compare 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a), 1682-1683 (1976) with 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000d to 2000d-2 (1976).
48. 441 U.S. at 694 n.16, 696 n.19.
49. id. at 696.
50. The principal decision the Court relied on was Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370
F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967). In that case the court of appeals deter-
mined that black school children were entitled to assert their right to equal educational oppor-
tunities in a private action under § 601 of title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). Id. at 851, 852.
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Inc. v. Connolly, 331 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Mich.
1971) and Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967) explicitly
adopted the position taken by the Fifth Circuit in Bossier Parish.
1980]
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awards of attorney's fees to parties prevailing in suits against governmental
educational agencies to compel compliance with, among other laws, title VI.
The Court treated this provision5 as direct evidence that Congress pre-
sumed a private action was available for enforcement of title VI. Finally,
the Court noted an absence of legislative action to change the prevailing
assumption that title VI, and hence title IX, created a private remedy for
victims of discrimination as a clear indicator of the requisite congressional
intent.
52
The third inquiry in the Cort analysis asks whether it is "consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply . . . a [private]
remedy for the plaintiff."'53 In Cannon the Supreme Court counseled against
implication if a private remedy would frustrate or interfere with the purpose
of the statute. If the remedy would be "at least helpful" in effectuating con-
gressional objectives, however, then implication may be justified.
54
The Court first identified the purposes for which title IX was enacted.
In the history of the statute it found, as a primary aim, a desire on the part of
Congress to avoid funding discriminatory activities with federal resources
and, as an additional objective, an interest in protecting individuals against
sex-based discrimination. The express statutory sanction of termination of
funds, while useful in accomplishing the first purpose, is severe, and the
Court concluded that it would not be an appropriate means to redress indi-
vidual grievances. Furthermore, the administrative enforcement mechanism
established in title IX and its companion regulations 55 does not include par-
ticipation by private complainants. No true administrative remedy is avail-
able, and the Court determined that an individual may be entirely at the
mercy of the funding agency should that agency decide not to investigate a
complaint.
The position taken by HEW throughout the Cannon litigation also per-
suaded the Court that implication of a private action would be consistent
with title IX's policies and objectives. The agency advocated such a remedy
as valuable in assisting federal enforcement and assuring compliance by pri-
vate institutions.
56
The fourth Cort criterion was easily met by the Court. That inquiry
tests whether the cause of action is one "traditionally relegated to state law
. . . so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely
51. Education Amendments of 1972, § 718, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976). Section 718 provides:
Upon the entry of a final order by a court of the United States against a local
educational agency, a State..., or the United States..., for ... discrimination on
the basis of race, color, or national origin in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, or the fourteenth amendment . . . as they pertain to elementary and
secondary education, the court, in its discretion, upon a finding that the proceedings
were necessary to bring about compliance, may allow the prevailing party ... a rea-
sonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
52. 441 U.S. at 703.
53. 422 U.S. at 78.
54. 441 U.S. at 703.
55. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976), 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.6-11, 86.17 (1978).
56. "The availability of a private right of action under Title IX would contribute substan-
tially to effective implementation of the statute's goals." Brief of Federal Respondents at 6. See
aLso Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 708 n.42.
[Vol. 57:3
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on federal law." 57 Declaring that the federal courts and the federal govern-
ment have traditionally been the chief guardians against discrimination and
noting the involvement of federal monies, the Court concluded that implica-
tion of a private action would not conflict with state interests.
Having analyzed title IX in terms of the four Cori factors, the Supreme
Court was satisfied that individuals allegedly discriminated against by edu-
cational institutions receiving federal funds should have their day in court.
With a parting admonition that the "far better course" is for Congress to
specify its intent with respect to private rights of action, the Court ruled that
petitioner Cannon could maintain her lawsuit against the medical schools. 58
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S REASONING
The Supreme Court's holding in Cannon v. Uniwerszty of Chicago is signifi-
cant because it furnishes one more weapon in the arsenal available to women
as they pursue equal opportunities in contemporary society. There is, how-
ever, a notable lack of precision in the conclusions the Court drew from its
evaluation of title IX under the Cori criteria. Additionally, certain of its
findings rest on weak foundations. Such flaws do not directly affect the re-
sult in Cannon, but they may well impair the case's value as a precedent for
implication of private actions under other civil rights statutes similar in
structure and effect to title IX. Finally, the Court neglected some policy
considerations respecting application of the implication doctrine which were
made necessary by virtue of agency involvement in and congressional activ-
ity subsequent to the enactment of title IX.
57. 422 U.S. at 78.
58. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 717. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stewart, endorsed the majority's closing comments and urged that
the Court should in the future be "extremely reluctant" to imply private rights of action in the
wake of congressional silence. Id at 718.
Three justices opposed the majority's decision and two filed dissenting opinions. Justice
White, joined by Justice Blackmun, found in the legislative history and in the general scheme of
title IX clear indications that Congress did not intend to allow a private right of action. He
further contended that a private action to enforce title VI could not be justified, and he chal-
lenged the holding in Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
388 U.S. 911 (1967), as well as the Cannon majority's reliance on the attorney's fee provision in
§ 718 of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976). See text accompanying
note 51 supra. Justice White concluded that Congress chose to omit a private enforcement
scheme from title IX, and its choice required the Court to abstain from implying one. 441 U.S.
at 7 18-30.
Justice Powell agreed with Justice White that title IX contains no implied private right of
action. He also took the opportunity to challenge the doctrine of implication as an unconstitu-
tional exercise of judicial power. "By creating a private action, a court of limited jurisdiction
necessarily extends its authority to embrace a dispute Congress has not assigned it to resolve.
[citations omitted] This . . .conflicts with the authority of Congress under Art. III [of the U.S.
Constitution] to set the limits of federal jurisdiction." Id at 746. He urged that only the "most
compelling evidence" of congressional intent to permit suits by private plaintiffs would justify
applying the doctrine of implication, and he voiced great "reluctan[ce] ever to permit a federal
court to volunteer its services for enforcement purposes" when a statute expressly provides an
enforcement mechanism of some type. Ad at 749. In closing, Justice Powell also cited, as sup-
port for his attack on the implication doctrine, a need to encourage Congress to anticipate and
resolve by itself the policy questions its legislation creates. Id
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A. The Nature of the Right Created
The Court was singularly imprecise in its analysis of the right created
by title IX. The first step in the Cort approach, 59 involving identification of
a federal right that a potential plaintiff may vindicate in a private lawsuit,
subsumes four specific inquiries. First, what is the purpose of the statute?
Second, what, if any, is the right it creates? Third, who is intended to enjoy
that right? And, finally, does the plaintiff in question come within the class
of intended beneficiaries?
In Cannon the Court delayed consideration of the purpose of title IX. It
did, however, make an oblique reference to a "benefit" the statute confers
and identified the beneficiaries of the statute as "persons discriminated
against on the basis of sex . . "60 On the strength of these findings the
Court concluded that petitioner Cannon was a member of the class benefited
by title IX.
The exact nature of the benefit bestowed by title IX is unclear, how-
ever. Further, neither the words of the statute nor their peculiar right-creat-
ing quality, on which the Court relied,61 support the Court's definition of
the class of persons Congress intended to protect by enacting the statute. If,
as the Court suggested, the benefited class consists of victims of sex discrimi-
nation, then no need arises for a private right of action under title IX. To
come within the Court's characterization of the statute's beneficiaries, one
would have to show that discrimination has occurred. In fact, what the typi-
cal title IX plaintiff alleges is a violation of a right to equal educational
opportunities. What is sought from the statute is a forum in which to prove
the violation and obtain relief.
62
It would seem, after a consideration of the purpose of title IX, as articu-
lated in its legislative history, 63 and from a careful reading of the language
in section 901,64 that the character of the benefited class is not so restricted
as the Supreme Court proposed, however inadvertently, in Cannon. A nar-
row interpretation indicates that the statute was designed to assure women
pursuing an education of freedom from discrimination on the basis of sex
and, therefore, of equal access with men to educational programs and insti-
tutions. A broader reading, and one consistent with the words of the act,
59. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
60. 441 U.S. at 694.
61. See i. at 690-93. See also text accompanying note 42 supra.
62. The Court's reasoning, properly applied, would exclude Geraldine Cannon from the
class of persons for whose benefit the statute was enacted. She has not yet had an opportunity
to prove that her exclusion from the medical schools at the University of Chicago and North-
western University was based on her sex.
63. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 30403 (1971) (Sen. Bayh: "Today I am submitting an
amendment . . . which will guarantee that women, too, enjoy the educational opportunity
every American deserves."); id at 39252 (Rep. Mink: "If we really believe in equality, we must
begin to insist that our institutions of higher learning practice it .... "); 118 CONG. REc. 5806-
07 (1972) (Sen. Bayh: "[Title IX] is a . . . measure which I believe is needed . . . to provide
women with solid legal protection as they seek education and training .. "); H.R. REP. No.
554, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52, reprtbtedmn [19721 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2462, 2511-12.
64. See note 4 supra.
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indicates that this guarantee of equal educational opportunities extends to
everyone.
Whatever the benefit it perceived in title IX and whatever the class of
persons it intended to designate as recipients of that benefit, what the Court
articulated in Cannon was an imprecise description of an important right and
an inaccurate identification of the holders of that right. Its pronouncement
is clearly at odds with the legislative intent it later tried so diligently to dis-
cern.
B. The Search for Congressional Intent
1. The Intent to Create a Private Right of Action
The Supreme Court's search through the legislative history of title IX
for signs of intent either to create or deny a private right of action, the sec-
ond step in the Cori analysis, 65 should have yielded insufficient evidence to
support its firm conclusions. This is not to say that the Court's ultimate
holding is incorrect. Rather, it is to suggest the Court should not have relied
so extensively on meager and often amorphous expressions of intent.
Too much of the Court's analysis of Congress' intent with respect to
creation of a private right of action focused on an unexamined conclusion
that title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196466 and its history support the
implication of such an action. From this premise it was an easy jump to the
conclusion that title IX, which was intentionally patterned after title VI,
6 7
likewise affords a private remedy. The propriety of implying a private cause
of action from title VI has never been thoroughly considered in the detailed
manner encouraged by the Cori v. Ash analysis. 68 On the strength of Bossier
Parish School Board v. Lemon 69 alone, federal courts have adjudicated viola-
tions of title VI rights. If, as several commentators have suggested7 ° and as is
implicit in the concurring opinion 7 l accompanying the Cannon decision, the
Supreme Court has been moving in a conservative direction and restricting
the application of the doctrine of implication, then it should be reluctant to
65. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
66. See note 16 supra.
67. See 117 CONG. REC. 30404, 30407-08 (1971).
68. In a separate opinion filed in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 379
(1978), Justice White had the following to say with respect to a private right of action under
title VI:
I write separately concerning the question of whether Title VI . . . provides for a
private cause of action. Four Justices are apparently of the view that such a private
cause of action exists, and four Justices assume it for purposes of this case. I am un-
willing merely to assume an affirmative answer. . . . As I see it, if we are not obliged
to do so, it is at least advisable to address this threshold jurisdictional issue. [citation
omitted] Furthermore, . . . it is at least questionable practice to adjudicate a novel
and difficult statutory issue without first considering whether we have jurisdiction to
decide it.
Id at 379-80. Justice White ultimately concluded that a private action is consistent with
neither the letter nor the spirit of title VI. Id at 387. His is not the prevailing view.
69. See note 50 supra.
70. Note, Imphiahon of Private Actionsjiom Federal Statutes.- From Borak to Ash, supra note 2;
Note, Imphed Przwate Actions Under Federal Statutes, supra note 2.
71. See note 58 supra.
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rely on a largely unscrutinized deduction. Arguably, the existence of a pri-
vate right of action should not be merely assumed.
Too much of the Court's rationale in Cannon also rested on presump-
tions that the legislators who enacted title IX were aware of the construction
placed on title VI favoring an action for private plaintiffs. The committee
reports and the debates on title IX furnish little evidence that Congress con-
sidered the matter of private lawsuits or anticipated problems that might
later arise in that regard. 72 That the Court misconstrued the workings of the
collective congressional mind is apparent from the debates precipitated by
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. 73 Congress itself was
uncertain in 1976 about the intentions of its predecessors with respect to
private rights of action based on title VI and title IX. It attempted to re-
solve the dilemma by adopting the attorney's fees act for use in the event
that the courts at some future date eliminated the confusion.
74
Contrary to the Supreme Court's assertion in Cannon,75 the legislative
history of title IX does not "plainly indicate" a wish or even a vague inten-
tion to create a private right of action under the statute. The record does
not give explicit evidence that Congress contemplated the matter, and reli-
ance on a presumed right of action under title VI does not strengthen the
Court's conclusion.
Perhaps the Court was trying to avoid relying directly on the legislative
history, given its limited utility and its susceptibility to varying interpreta-
tions. Rather than straining to interpret the congressional silence and rely-
ing on assumptions about the legislators' understanding of title VI, however,
the Court would have done better to acknowledge the absence of any expres-
72. The matter most on the minds of the legislators was the propriety of further involving
the federal government in the affairs of private educational institutions. See, e.g., 117 CONG.
REC. 30412, 39248-49, 39253-54, 39255 (1971).
There was concern about enforcement mechanisms during the consideration of title VI.
The debate focused not on private enforcement actions, however, but on the perceived potential
for arbitrary terminations of funds by federal agencies. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 1520, 5252-55,
6544-45, 7059-60, 7076-78, 7103 (1964).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). The act authorizes courts to award reasonable attorneys' fees
to parties prevailing in suits to enforce certain civil rights statutes, including title VI and title
Ix.
74. Some members of Congress did envision private enforcement of all the civil rights laws.
See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. 31471, 31832, 35118, 35128 (1976). The prevailing attitude is best
captured, however, in the following remarks by Representatives Drinan and Railsback:
Mr. Drinan. We accept preexisting law, whatever it is, and simply state that the
routine . . . language on through the U.S. Code giving to the prevailing party . . .
reasonable attorneys' fees shall be applied to title IX.
Mr. Railsback. I have been informed . . . that under title VI of the Civil Rights
Act and title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 there exists a serious question
as to whether an individual complainant . . . has the right to sue as a private plaintiff.
[He then referred to the decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Cannon v.
University of Chicago].
It has been brought to my attention that by granting attorneys' fees to prevailing
parties . . . , Congress might implicitly authorize a private right of action under title
VI and title IX. This is not the intent of Congress. This bill [Attorney's Fees Awards
Act] merely creates a remedy in the event the courts determine that an individual may
sue under these statutes.
Id. at 35116, 35124.
75. 441 U.S. at 694.
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sions of intent and then to examine the legislative history of title IX for
evidence of the purposes underlying the statute.76
2. The Objectives of Title IX
The Supreme Court's analysis in Cannon, in conjunction with the third
Cori inquiry, 77 of the purposes underlying title IX suffers from the same im-
precision afflicting the conclusions reached in its evaluation of the right cre-
ated by the statute. Moreover, in its effort to identify purposes the Court
was unnecessarily specific. Those it does articulate are, arguably, too narrow
to justify implication of a private right of action, and rather than ends, they
seem more to be means for the achievement of some broader goal. A private
action under title IX is consistent with the purposes underlying the legisla-
tive scheme but not with the purposes perceived by the Court.
78
Two problems are apparent in the Court's declaration of the objectives
of title IX. First, it would seem that creation of a private right of action
would do little to assist the government with depriving discriminatory edu-
cational programs of federal financial assistance. The typical plaintiff would
not be likely to sue to terminate federal funds, a remedy recognized as severe
and one to be used after all other attempts to achieve compliance with the
statute have failed. 79 Rather, an aggrieved individual would, like Geraldine
Cannon, be seeking relief more personal in nature and more appropriate to
redress the grievance.
The second problem arises from the Court's statement of the second
objective. Had Congress had as a central purpose in enacting title IX the
desire to provide protection to individuals, it would probably have been ex-
plicit about the means it contemplated to achieve such protection. In other
civil rights statutes it took care to detail enforcement mechanisms available
to individuals for vindication of their rights. 80 There is little, if any, evi-
dence in title IX that Congress considered specific ways to relieve personal
76. One criticism of the Cort approach to implication of private rights of action is that its
second criterion encourages exactly the kind of analysis used by the Supreme Court in Cannon.
See Note, Implied Private Actions, Under Federal Statutes: From Borak to Ash, supra note 2, at 450-54.
In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), decided shortly after Cannon, the
Court declined to infer that § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(q)(a)(1)
(1976), allows damages actions by individual plaintiffs. After declaring that the four Cort fac-
tors are not necessarily entitled to "equal weight" in the Court's deliberations, 442 U.S. at 575,
the majority's opinion asserted that "the ultimate question is one of congressional intent .
442 U.S. at 578.
Although the judicial aim is, apparently, to be objective, this relentless quest for congres-
sional intent is likely to yield more strained and inconsistent analyses of federal statutes. Per-
haps, as Justice Powell suggested in his Cannon dissent, 441 U.S. 742, 749, the Cort scheme is not
adequate to overcome the problems and hazards inherent in judicial attempts to discern legisla-
tive intent.
77. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
78. See text accompanying notes 53-56 supra.
79. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 1661, 5254-55, 7067 (1964) (severity of enforcement scheme in
title VI).
80. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1976) (private suits for violations of Equal Pay Act); 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (1976) (private suits for relief from racial discrimination in public accommo-
dations); 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-8 (1976) (private suits for relief from racial discrimination in public
1980]
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injustices. 8 ' It appears that the Court created purposes in order to justify
implication of a private right of action rather than identifying the principal
congressional purposes that motivated the enactment of the statute and then
determining whether a private right of action would, at the very least, assist
in accomplishing them.
An analysis based on the third Cori factor more accurate than that used
by the Supreme Court would first ascertain the "broad remedial purposes"
8 2
behind title IX and then evaluate whether a private right of action would be
consistent with them. This approach reveals as a primary goal the elimina-
tion of gender-based discrimination, particularly the invidious forms it has
taken in academe.83 The language of section 90184 points to this purpose as
do the statutes and amendments the title IX package contained 85 and the
legislative history when considered in its entirety and not in isolated seg-
ments.8 6 These sources further indicate that conditioning use of federal
funds in educational activities on assurances of nondiscrimination was
viewed as a means to eradicate discrimination based on sex and secure equal
academic opportunities for all individuals. The sanction of terminating
financial assistance could be effectively supplemented by private lawsuits
challenging procedures at educational institutions. Successful actions by in-
dividuals would complement title IX's administrative enforcement scheme
by giving notice to federal agencies of potentially pervasive discriminatory
practices within certain educational programs. The two mechanisms to-
gether may have a powerful deterrent effect as well.
Finally, as the Court itself noted, creation of a private right of action
may be necessary to achieve the fundamental purpose of the statute. HEW,
the agency with primary enforcement responsibilities, has asserted that it is
ill-equipped to police the numerous recipients of federal funds.8 7 Thus, so
long as it operates in addition to and not instead of the administrative
education); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976) (private suits for violations of Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act).
Six months after delivering the Cannon decision, a majority of the Court refused to find a
private right of action for damages in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I
to -21 (1976). Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242 (1979). It is
interesting that the Court not only justified the holding on the basis of the statutory means
available to the Securities and Exchange Commission for achieving compliance with the Act, ld
at 247, but it also relied on the provisions for private suits contained in other securities laws. Id
& n.10. The latter evidence, the Court reasoned, clearly revealed that Congress knows how to
provide individuals with a right of action when it wishes to do so. Id at 248. Borrowing from
Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Cannon, the Court concluded that "it is highly improbable
that 'Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended private action' " in the Invest-
ment Advisers Act. (d. at 247. See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 572.
81. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
82. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964).
83. See 117 CONG. REC. 30403, 30405-06 (1971) (excerpts from the Report of the Presi-
dent's Task Force on Women's Rights and Responsibilities).
84. See note 4 supra; J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964).
85. See H.R. REP. No. 554, supra note 62, at 2512, 2566-67; S. CONF. REP. 798, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 221-22, repnhtedin [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2462, 2671-72.
86. See 117 CONG. REC. 30399-415, 39248-63 (1971); 118 CONG. REC. 5803-15, 18831-63
(1972).
87. 441 U.S. at 706-07, 708 n.42. Some of this responsibility has been transferred to the
new Department of Education which may eventually be better able to handle the burden. See
Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 668 (1979).
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scheme, a private remedy could advance the goal of title IX and, perhaps,
promote some efficiency in the implementation of the statutory enforcement
mechanism.
Implication of a private right of action from title IX can be justified
under the Cori v. Ash analysis.8 8 The Supreme Court simply failed in Cannon
to make thorough and effective use of the language and the origins of the
statute.
V. THE EFFECT OF CANNON
The decision in Cannon v. Uniersio of Chicago is consistent with the
emerging national policy toward eliminating discrimination based on sex.
Its role as a civil rights case may even excuse the inexact analysis of the basis
for implying a private right of action under title IX.
The Court should, however, have been more attentive to certain
problems inherent in its application of the implication doctrine. It is un-
likely that Congress is now unaware of the controversies that have arisen
over implying private rights of action from its statutes, but various legislative
colloquies, as recently as 1976,89 indicate that Congress is willing to let the
courts continue their struggle to interpret its customary silence on the ques-
tion. 90 At some point Congress will have to accept responsibility for framing
legislation complete with clearly articulated rights and comprehensive reme-
dies. 9 1 While maintaining some degree of flexibility in its schemes, it will
have to anticipate the increasingly familiar implication issue.
Given its wider significance, Cannon was perhaps not the appropriate
case for the Supreme Court to insist that Congress be specific and complete.
The federal legislators may do well, however, to heed the subtle warning
that concludes the opinion in Cannon.
9 2
One additional potential problem deserved notice in connection with
the Court's decision to imply a private right of action under title IX. Con-
gress is not the only entity that might ignore or overlook its responsibilities as
long as courts will fill the gaps it leaves. The federal agencies too can profit
when the judiciary creates new rights of action. It is possible that in the
wake of the Cannon decision HEW will see fit, faced as it is with the crush of
other tasks, to abdicate by mere inaction the statutory duties bestowed by
title IX, leaving enforcement of the act to private plaintiffs. Lurking, there-
fore, in the Court's finding of a private right of action may be a concomitant
obligation upon individuals to oversee HEW and other agencies that provide
financial assistance to educational institutions. The courts likewise should be
attentive and responsive to citizens' suits brought to compel agencies to act
in accordance with the statutory scheme. In the final analysis, the govern-
88. See also Comment, Prvate Rights of Action Under T~t/e IX, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
425 (1978).
89. See note 73 supra.
90. Justice Frankfurter once observed that "[l1oose judicial reading makes for loose legisla-
tive writing." Frankfurter, Some Refctt'ons on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 545
(1947).
91. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 749 (Powell, J., dissenting).
92. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
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ment, with its power to terminate funds, wields one of the strongest weapons
in the fight against sex-based discrimination.
CONCLUSION
In Cannon v. Uniersiy of Chicago, the Supreme Court used the implica-
tion doctrine to find a private right of action under title IX. Its holding
followed an ostensibly thorough analysis, which closer scrutiny reveals to be
tenuous and inexact. Despite the Court's effort to discern congressional in-
tent so as to effectuate legislative goals, it ultimately succeeded only in em-
bracing a mirage.
Diane L. Burkhardt
